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Abstract
Recently, Yan et al. proposed a quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) pro-
tocol with authentication using single photons and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs
(Yan et al., CMC-Computers, Materials & Continua, 63(3), 2020). In this work, we show
that the QSDC protocol is not secure against intercept-and-resend attack and imperson-
ation attack. An eavesdropper can get the full secret message by applying these attacks.
We propose a modification of this protocol, which defeats the above attacks along with
all the familiar attacks.
Keywords— Quantum cryptography; Impersonation attack; Intercept-and-resend attack; Secu-
rity loophole
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography is an application of quantum mechanics in the field of cryptography, which
provides unconditional security based on the laws of physics. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed
the first quantum cryptographic protocol, which is a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, also
called the BB84 QKD [1]. Since then various types of QKD protocols have been proposed, such as
QKD with entanglement [2, 3, 4], without entanglement [5, 6], experimental QKD [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] and
so on.
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is another direction of quantum cryptography,
which offers secure communication without any shared key [3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. In QSDC
protocols, the sender encodes the secret message into some qubits by using some predefined encoding
rules and sends those qubits to the receiver. After some security checks, the receiver can get back
the secret message. Some interesting generalization of QSDC protocols are quantum dialogue or
bidirectional QSDC [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], multi-party QSDC [26, 27, 28, 29] and so on.
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If QSDC or any quantum cryptographic protocol is not properly designed, it gives a chance to an
eavesdropper to impersonate an authorized party. For this concern, each legitimate party should verify
the authenticity of other parties, which requires quantum authentication protocols [30, 31, 32]. The
first QSDC protocol with authentication was proposed in 2006 [33], and thereafter many researchers
are working in this domain [34, 35, 36].
There are multiple quantum cryptographic protocols, which are proven to be insecure against
various familiar attacks, such as, intercept-and-resend attack [37, 38, 39], impersonation attack [40,
41, 42], Denial-of-Service attack [43, 44, 45], man-in-the-middle attack [46, 47], entangle-measure
attack [45, 48], Trojan horse attack [49, 50] etcetera. These are all active attacks, i.e., an eavesdropper
has access to the communicated qubits in the quantum channel between the legitimate parties, and
actively participates in the protocol. Some inactive attack also causes information leakage problems
in some communication protocols [51, 52].
In 2020, Yan et al. have presented a QSDC protocol based on single photons and EPR pairs,
which also realizes the mutual authentication [53]. For simplicity, throughout this paper, we call
this QSDC protocol as YZCSS protocol. In this protocol, Alice, the message sender, prepares qubit
pairs corresponding to the secret message and her authentication identity. She sends all the qubits
to Bob, the message receiver, who uses his authentication identity to recover the secret message.
However, in this article, we show that the YZCSS protocol is not secure against intercept-and-resend
attack and impersonation attack. If an eavesdropper applies any one of these attacks, then it can get
the complete secret message, i.e., not only a portion of the message is revealed, but also the entire
message is compromised. Moreover, for impersonation attack, the legitimate parties can not realize
the presence of the eavesdropper. Furthermore, we present a modification of the YZCSS protocol to
improve its security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly describe the YZCSS protocol,
then in the next section we discuss the security flaws of the YZCSS protocol. An improved version of
the protocol is presented in Section 4 and finally we conclude our result.
2 Brief review of the YZCSS protocol
In this section, we describe the YZCSS protocol. There are two parties, namely, Alice and Bob with
their corresponding identities IDA and IDB respectively, where IDA, IDB ∈ {0, 1}N . Alice wants
to send a secret message M ∈ {0, 1}N to Bob by using single photons and Bell states, where the Bell
states (EPR pairs) are defined as:
∣∣Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), ∣∣Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (1)
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. Alice and Bob have their previously shared identities IDA and IDB, they used some QKD
to exchange IDA and IDB. Alice prepares two ordered sets of two-qubit states SM and SA
corresponding to the message M and her own identity IDA, each ordered set contains N qubit
pairs. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let the i-th bit of M (or IDA or IDB) be Mi (or IDA,i or IDB,i) and
the i-th qubit of SM (or SA) be SM,i (or SA,i). She prepares the qubits by using the following
rule:
(a) if Mi (or IDA,i) = 0, then SM,i (or SA,i) = |01〉 or |10〉 with equal probability,
(b) if Mi (or IDA,i) = 1, then SM,i (or SA,i) = |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉 with equal probability.
The qubit pairs of the ordered set SA are called decoy states. Now Alice inserts these decoy
states into the ordered set SM according to the following rule:
(a) if IDB,i = 0, then she inserts SA,i before SM,i, and
(b) if IDB,i = 1, then she inserts SA,i after SM,i.
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Table 1: Different cases of the YZCSS protocol
Secret message Encoded Basis chosen measurement Decoded
bit of Alice Mi qubit SM,i by Bob result of Bob secret bit
0
|01〉 Z × Z basis |01〉 0
Bell basis |Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉 0
|10〉 Z × Z basis |10〉 0
Bell basis |Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉 0
1
|Φ+〉 Z × Z basis |00〉 or |11〉 1
Bell basis |Φ+〉 1
|Φ−〉 Z × Z basis |00〉 or |11〉 1
Bell basis |Φ−〉 1
Let the new ordered set be S containing 2N qubit pairs. Then Alice sends S to bob using a
quantum channel. Let us take an example.
Example 1 Let M = 10110, IDA = 01101 and IDB = 01001.
Then SM = {|Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉}, SA = {|10〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉} and
S = {|10〉 , |Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉}.
2. After Bob receives S, he knows the exact positions of the decoy photons corresponding to his
identity IDB. Bob measures those decoy photons in proper bases according to IDA. If IDA,i =
0, then he chooses Z ×Z basis, where Z = {|0〉 , |1〉}, thus Z ×Z = {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉}, and
if IDA,i = 1, then he chooses the Bell basis = {|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉} to measure SA,i. Bob
also measures the qubit pairs of SM in Z × Z basis or Bell basis randomly. He notes the
measurement results.
3. Bob asks Alice to announce the initial states of the qubit pairs of SA for security check. They
compare the initial states and the measurement results of the decoy photons and calculate the
error rate. If the error rate exceeds some pre-defined threshold value, then they terminate the
protocol, else they continue.
4. Bob gets all the secret message bits from the measurement results of the qubit pairs of SM .
The relation between the measurement results and the secret message bits are given in Table 1.
To check the integrity of the secret message Alice and Bob publicly compare some parts of the
message.
The authors of [53] have shown that the YZCSS protocol is secure against various kinds of attacks, such
as impersonation attack, intercept-and-resend attack, man-in-the-middle attack, entangle-measure
attack. However, in the next section, we show that an eavesdropper can design a strategy that
allows him to effectively execute the intercept-and-resend attack. A similar argument follows for
impersonation attack as well, making this protocol insecure against these two attacks.
3 Security loophole of the YZCSS protocol
We now show that the YZCSS protocol discussed in the previous section is not secure against intercept-
and-resend attack and impersonation attack, an eavesdropper (Eve) can get the whole secret message
M and Alice’s authentication identity IDA by adopting these attacks.
3.1 Intercept-and-resend attack
In this attack strategy, when Alice sends the quantum states to Bob, Eve intercepts those from the
quantum channel, he measures the states and resends those to Bob. However, to attack the YZCSS
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protocol, Eve follows a special strategy while resending the quantum states to Bob. The process of
the attack is as follows.
1. Eve intercepts the ordered set S and measures each two-qubit state randomly in Z × Z basis
or Bell basis and notes down the measurement results. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N , if he chooses Z × Z
basis to measure the i-th qubit pair of S and the measurement result is either |01〉 or |10〉, then
he simply sends this state to Bob. But if the measurement result is either |00〉 or |11〉, Eve
definitely knows that he chooses the wrong basis and the initial state was either |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉.
Then he randomly prepares |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉 and sends it to Bob. Similarly if Eve chooses Bell
basis and gets |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉, then sends them. Otherwise, he randomly sends |01〉 or |10〉 to
Bob.
2. Eve constructs a 2N -bit string m from the measurement results by using Table 2.
Table 2: Rule of construction of m by Eve
Basis chosen by Eve Eve’s measurement result Corresponding bit of m
Z × Z basis |01〉 or |10〉 0|00〉 or |11〉 1
Bell basis
|Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉 0
|Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉 1
3. Eve splits the 2N -bit stringm = m1m2 . . .m2N intoN number of 2-bit stringsM1,M2, . . . ,MN ,
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Mi = m2i−1m2i. Now from the construction procedure of the ordered set
S, Eve exactly knows that each Mi contains the i-th bit of secret message M and the i-th
bit of Alice’s authentication identity IDA. If both the bits of Mi are equal, i.e., Mi = bb,
where b ∈ {0, 1}, then he concludes Mi = b and IDA,i = b. Again if Mi = bb¯, where b¯ = bit
complement of b, then he waits for Alice’s announcement about the initial states of the decoy
photons. If she announces |01〉 or |10〉, then Eve concludes IDA,i = 0 and Mi = 1, otherwise
he concludes IDA,i = 1 and Mi = 0. Thus Eve can successfully attack the protocol and gets
the complete secret message.
Now Alice and Bob can detect this intercept-and-resend attack at the time of security check, but it
has no impact on the attack result as one of the main requirement of a QSDC protocol is: “the secret
messages which have been encoded already in the quantum states should not leak even though an
eavesdropper may get hold of channel” [14].
3.2 Impersonation attack
By analyzing the YZCSS protocol, we find that the authentication procedure of this QSDC protocol
is unidirectional, i.e., only Bob can verify Alice’s identity. Here we show that how Eve impersonate
Bob to acquire the secret message of Alice. The process is as follows:
1. Alice prepares the ordered set S and sends it to Eve.
2. After receiving S, Evemeasures all the qubit pairs randomly in Z×Z or Bell basis and generates
a 2N -bit string m from the measurement results by using Table 2.
3. Eve asks Alice to declare the initial state of the decoy photons and from this information, he
gets the whole secret message (by using the same process as in Step 3 of the intercept-and-resend
attack).
In this case, Alice can not detect Eve, or in other words, only one-way authentication is possible in
the YZCSS protocol. Moreover, without knowing the exact position of the decoy photons, Eve can
get the whole secret message.
Let us take an example of this attack.
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Example 2 Let M = 10110, IDA = 01101 and IDB = 01001.
Then SM = {|Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉}, SA = {|10〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉} and
S = {|10〉 , |Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉}.
1. Eve has the ordered set S.
2. Let B = {Z,Z,Bell, Z,Bell,Bell,Bell, Z, Z,Bell} be a sequence of bases which Eve choses to
measure the qubit pairs of S.
3. Let the ordered set of measurement results be
{|10〉 , |00〉 , |Ψ−〉 , |11〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ+〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |11〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉}.
4. Then m = 0101110101 andM1 = 01,M2 = 01,M3 = 11,M4 = 01,M5 = 01. Eve concludes
M3 = 1 and IDA,3 = 1.
5. Alice announces SA = {|10〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉} and then Eve concludes
• IDA,1 = 0 and M1 = 1,
• IDA,2 = 1 and M2 = 0,
• IDA,4 = 0 and M4 = 1,
• IDA,5 = 1 and M5 = 0.
Thus Eve gets the whole secret message M = 10110.
Another problem of the YZCSS protocol is that the length of the authentication identities of Alice
and Bob are equal to the length of the secret message. Since the identities are previously shared,
Alice can send a fixed length message to Bob, which is a disadvantage of this protocol. In the next
section, we propose a remedy to these security problems of the YZCSS protocol.
4 Proposed modification
Now we discuss how to modify this YZCSS protocol so that it can provide mutual authentication and
stand against the intercept-and-resend attack. In the original protocol, the length of IDA and IDB
are equal to the length of the message, which may vary. However, in our improved version, we fix
the length of IDA and IDB, and the fixed-length is unknown to any third party. Here we use some
techniques of the authentication protocol proposed by Fei et al. [42]. Our modified protocol is given
below:
1. Qubits preparation to encode secret message:
(a) Alice and Bob have their previously shared k-bit identities IDA and IDB, where k, IDA
and IDB are unknown to everybody other than Alice and Bob. Alice prepares an ordered
set of N qubit pairs SM corresponding to her N -bit message M . For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , she
prepares the qubit pairs of SM by using the following rule:
Mi =
{
0⇒ SM,i = |01〉 or |10〉 , with equal probability;
1⇒ SM,i = |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉 , with equal probability.
(2)
She applies a random permutation on the ordered set SM containing 2N qubits and let
the new ordered set be QM . For 1 ≤ j ≤ 2N , let the j-th qubit QM be QM,j. Note that
the two qubits of each qubit pair corresponding to the message bits are in two random
positions of QM .
(b) Alice prepares the first ordered set of decoy photons SA, for authentication, corresponding
to her own identity IDA as follows: for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
IDA,i =
{
0⇒ SA,i = |0〉 or |1〉 , with equal probability;
1⇒ SA,i = |+〉 or |−〉 , with equal probability,
(3)
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where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). Now she inserts these decoy states
into the ordered set QM according to the following rule: for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
i. if IDB,i = 0, then she inserts SA,i before QM,λi−λ−1,
ii. if IDB,i = 1, then she inserts SA,i after QM,λi,
where λ = [2N/k], [x] = greatest integer not greater than x and k ≤ N . Let the new
ordered set be S containing 2N + k qubits. For better understanding, let us take an
example,
Example 3 Let M = 1011010, IDA = 011 and IDB = 010.
i. SM = {|Φ+〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |01〉 , |Φ+〉 , |10〉} and let the i-th pair of SM be (S1M,i, S2M,i).
ii. QM = {S1M,6, S2M,4, S2M,2, S1M,4, S2M,3, S1M,1, S1M,2, S1M,7, S2M,1, S1M,5, S2M,6, S1M,3, S2M,5, S2M,7}.
iii. SA = {|0〉 , |−〉 , |−〉}.
iv. λ = [14/3] = 4.
v. S = {|0〉 , S1M,6, S2M,4, S2M,2, S1M,4, S2M,3, S1M,1, S1M,2, S1M,7, |−〉 , |−〉 , S2M,1, S1M,5, S2M,6, S1M,3,
S2M,5, S
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M,7}.
(c) She prepares a second set of decoy photons randomly from {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and inserts
them in random positions of S and sends the new ordered set S′ to Bob using a quantum
channel.
2. Security check: After Bob receives S′, Alice announces the positions and bases of the second
set of decoy photons. Bob measures those decoy photon and they calculate the error rate in
the channel by comparing the measurement results with the initial states. If the error rate is
low, then they continue the protocol, otherwise terminate this.
3. Authentication procedure:
(a) Bob knows the exact positions of the decoy photons of SA corresponding to his identity
IDB. He measures those decoy photons in proper bases according to IDA. If IDA,i = 0,
then he chooses the Z basis and if IDA,i = 1, then he chooses the X = {|+〉 , |−〉} basis
to measure SA,i.
(b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Alice and Bob construct an k-bit string info(SA) such that, if SA,i = |0〉
or |+〉, then info(SA,i) = 0, else info(SA,i) = 1.
(c) They randomly choose k/2 (approximate) positions and Alice announces the values of the
corresponding bits of info(SA). Bob compares these values with his corresponding mea-
surement results to authenticate Alice’s identity. Similarly Bob announces the remaining
bits of info(SA) for his identity authentication. If any of them finds intolerable error rate,
then he or she aborts this protocol.
4. Message decoding:
(a) Bob discards all the decoy photons and gets back the ordered set QM .
(b) Alice announces the random permutation which she applied on SM . Bob applies the
inverse permutation on QM and gets SM .
(c) He measures the qubit pairs of SM in Z × Z basis or Bell basis randomly and notes the
measurement results.
(d) Bob gets all the secret message bits from the measurement results of the qubit pairs of
SM . The relation between the measurement results and the secret message bits are given
in Table 1. To check the integrity of the secret message, Alice and Bob publicly compare
some parts of the message.
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4.1 Security analysis of the modified protocol
We now show that our modified protocol is secure against some common attacks. First, we discuss
the intercept-and-resend attack and the impersonation attack as the original YZCSS protocol was
proven to be insecure against these two attacks. Then we also discuss Denial-of-Service attack, man-
in-the-middle attack, entangle-measure attack and Trojan horse attack.
1. Intercept-and-resend attack: Let Eve intercepts the ordered set S′ from the quantum
channel. Since each qubit of the qubit pairs corresponding to the secret message is in random
position, it is impossible for Eve to find correct qubit pairs of SM . At-most Eve can do is to
measure the qubits of S′ in Z or X basis. In that case, he does not get any useful information
about the secret message, and also Alice and Bob detect him and terminate the protocol at the
time of security checking (Step 2 of the modified protocol). Note that, if Alice does not apply
the random permutation on the qubits of SM , then Eve may get some information about the
secret message, though in that case also Alice and Bob can detect his presence.
2. Impersonation attack: In the YZCSS protocol, only Alice announces the exact states of the
decoy photons corresponding to IDA and Bob compares them with his measurement results to
check the authenticity of Alice. In the modified version, both Alice and Bob have to announce
the information about the initial states of the decoy photons of SA, they do not announce the
exact states to keep IDA secret. If Eve impersonating any one of Alice and Bob, then the other
one can detect him and aborts this protocol (since the length k of IDA is unknown to Eve, he
can not calculate λ). Moreover, in this case also Eve can not get any information about M as
the corresponding qubits of each qubit pairs of SM are at random positions in QM .
3. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack: The motivation of Eve, for adopting the DoS attack, is to
tamper the secret message. Let Eve captures the ordered set S′ and makes a certain operation
to every qubit of S′. However, this action will be detected by the legitimate parties at the
security checking procedure in Step 2 and as a result, Alice and Bob terminate this protocol.
Now suppose that Eve makes changes in only a few qubits, then if the introduced error in
Step 2 is smaller than the threshold value, Alice and Bob can not detect Eve. In that case, it
introduces a very small amount of error in the secret message, which is also negligible.
4. Man-in-the-middle attack: When Alice sends the ordered set S′ to Bob, Eve intercepts S′
and keep this with him. He prepares another set of qubits S′′ and sends it to Bob. In this case,
also Alice and Bob can realize the existence of Eve and abort the protocol in Step 2.
5. Entangle-measure attack:
In order to steal partial information, Eve may apply this attack. He first intercepts the qubits
of the ordered set S′ and prepares some ancillary state |E〉, then applies an unitary UE to the
joint states of qubits of S′ and |E〉 such that the composite system become entangled. However,
the effect of the unitary operation UE on the second set of decoy photons are as follows:
UE |0〉 |E〉 = α0 |0〉 |E00〉+ β0 |1〉 |E01〉 ,
UE |1〉 |E〉 = α1 |0〉 |E10〉+ β1 |1〉 |E11〉 .
(4)
Since UE is unitary, we must have
|α0|2 + |β0|2 = 1,
|α1|2 + |β1|2 = 1,
α0α
∗
1 + β0β
∗
1 = 0
(5)
Thus when the decoy states are prepared in Z basis, the error rate is e = |β0|2 = |α1|2.
Further, we get
UE |+〉 |E〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |E++〉+ |−〉 |E+−〉),
UE |−〉 |E〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |E−+〉+ |−〉 |E−−〉),
(6)
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where
• |E++〉 = 1√
2
(α0 |E00〉+ β0 |E01〉+ α1 |E10〉+ β1 |E11〉),
• |E+−〉 = 1√
2
(α0 |E00〉 − β0 |E01〉+ α1 |E10〉 − β1 |E11〉),
• |E−+〉 = 1√
2
(α0 |E00〉+ β0 |E01〉 − α1 |E10〉 − β1 |E11〉),
• |E−−〉 = 1√
2
(α0 |E00〉 − β0 |E01〉 − α1 |E10〉+ β1 |E11〉).
Thus when the decoy states are prepared in X basis, the error rate is 1/2. Thus from the error
rate introduced by Eve in the communication process, Alice and Bob detect this eavesdropping
in Step 2. Furthermore, the random permutation applied on SM increases the security of the
modified version and Eve does not get any useful information about the secret message by
measuring the ancillary states.
6. Trojan horse attack: Both the YZCSS protocol and its modified version are one-way quantum
communication protocols, i.e., only Alice prepares qubits and sends them to Bob. Thus these
protocols have immunity to the Trojan horse attack.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the security of QSDC protocols with authentication (YZCSS protocol) and
demonstrate that this protocol is vulnerable to two specific attacks, namely, intercept-and-resend
attack and impersonation attack. An eavesdropper adopting any one of these two attacks gets the
whole secret message. The authentication process in the YZCSS protocol is unidirectional, which
causes the impersonation attack. To address these concerns, we propose a modification of the YZCSS
protocol, where a mutual authentication process is suggested, and the modified protocol resists the
intercept-and-resend attack. We also prove that it is secure against several familiar attack strategies.
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